An Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of NIC's Institutional Culture Initiative: Year 2 Update*

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Introduction and Overview of Report

The following report summarizes the efforts of the evaluation team to assess the

implementation and initial impact of the National Institute of Corrections' Institutional Culture

Initiative. The time period covered in this report is between September 15, 2003 and

September 15, 2005. We begin our report by providing a critical review of the conceptual

framework – developed by NIC – guiding the current initiative. Next, we provide an overview

of the study's evaluation design and then describe our primary data sources and survey protocol.

The third section of the report includes our preliminary assessment of the implementation of each

of the four initiatives included in our review. In section four, we present our initial assessment of

the impact of the initiative. Utilizing a combination of quantitative and qualitative data collected

at selected sites [Note: for confidentiality, no specific site names/locations are included in this

review] we offer a preliminary assessment of the impact of the NIC Initiative in each of the

following two areas: (1) pre-test/post-test comparisons of changes in the level of violence and

disorder in these prisons (as measured by both incidents and grievances); and (2) quarterly

changes in the staff's perceptions of prison culture in these facilities (using survey data). We

conclude our report by offering a summary of key findings, and then highlighting the "lessons

learned" from the first two years of our evaluation.

Conceptual Framework: An Overview of NIC's Culture Change Strategy

A number of recent, comprehensive reviews of the research on the causes of various

forms of prison violence and disorder (e.g. Edgar et. al, 2003; Bottoms, 1999; Liebling, 1999;

Braswell, Montgomery, and Lombardo, 1994; Adams, 1992) have examined the impact of

"culture" on the level of order and control within the prison. However, much of the research

identified in these reviews examined inmate (not staff) culture; and with few exceptions, no attempt was made to link changes in inmate (or staff) culture to changes in prison violence and disorder. Stated simply, there is no body of existing scientific evidence that can be referenced to support the dual notions that (1) prison "culture" is one of the primary causes of prison violence and disorder, and (2) That changes in prison culture (i.e. movement from a negative to a positive culture) will result in improvements in the performance of prisons in the control of violence and disorder. Based on the examination of the available research on the causes of prison violence and disorder (Byrne, Taxman and Hummer, 2005), it is clear that the conceptual framework underlying this initiative was developed based on the combined *experiences* of NIC staff and its contracted service providers; it was not based on an evidence-based review of the research on "best practices" in this critical program/policy area.

Despite this research "shortfall", it is still possible to trace the origins and development of this initiative (see figures 1 and 2 in appendix C for an overview of the project, and the implementation timeline). Because the NIC project was designed based on the *experience* of NIC staff and service providers, not on a review of research of "best practices", it is important to consider the context of that experience. For several years, NIC received repeated requests for assistance from corrections managers across the country concerning a variety of inmate, staff and management problems (e.g. staff sexual misconduct, excessive use of force, inmate misconduct/drug use, staff retention). When traditional strategies (often based on training and education) did not appear to work, NIC program developers (lead by Dr. Susan Hunter) decided to try a different approach, based on the notion that in many prisons, the "presenting" problem was actually a symptom of a more serious underlying problem: the negative prison culture that existed in these institutions. According to NIC program developers, the underlying assumption of

the Culture Change Initiative is straightforward: if negative prison culture is one of the primary causes of various forms of prison conflict, violence and disorder, then it certainly makes sense to focus on "culture change" as a primary solution to this problem. While there are certainly a myriad of possible strategies that can be included in this type of broad, organizational change initiative, the four interventions described in the following section represent NIC's preliminary attempt to develop reliable and valid assessment protocol and then test three possible interventions (of varying scope, duration, and intensity) designed to positively change the culture of selected prisons.

An obivious starting point to our review was to ask NIC program developers how they define prison culture generally, and how they distinguish positive from negative prison culture. Prison (or institutional) culture has been defined in a variety of ways, but in this initiative, it refers to "the values, assumptions, and beliefs people hold that drive the way the institution functions and the way people think and behave" (NIC's working definition of institutional culture 2003). Although NIC program developers did not explicitly define either positive or negative prison culture, it appears that "negative" prison culture was believed to be associated with a variety of staff-related (staff morale, staff sexual misconduct, lack of diversity), management-related (ineffective communication, convoluted mission, lack of leadership), and offender-related (racial tension, prisoner drug use, escapes) problems. The NIC initiative targeted both staff and management culture as their primary focus, based on the following key assumption: "*if we change staff culture, inmate culture will follow*" (Corcoran, 2004, personal communication). This is an interesting research question, which has not been explored by researchers studying either staff culture (e.g. Carrol, 2003), or inmate culture (e.g. Toch and Maruna, 2005; Edgar, O'Donnell and Martin, 2003).

Based on this assumption, NIC has designed a strategy that targets staff (and management) culture; the "inmate culture" issue is not addressed directly. However, NIC program developers believe that changes in staff culture will affect inmates in two specific ways. First, staff attitudes towards specific types of offenders (e.g. sex offenders) and groups of offenders (e.g. minority offenders) will be changed positively as a result of this initiative. Second, as a result of these attitude changes it is expected that staff behavior will also change in a number of important respects. For example, both staff tolerance of prisoner-on-prisoner violence (e.g. inadequate staff response to allegations of sexual assault) and the use of force by staff on inmates (i.e. institutional violence) are expected to decrease as a result of this initiative. The idea that rates of violence and disorder in prison can be lowered *without* specifically addressing inmate culture is a central tenant of this NIC-ICI initiative. We discuss the implications of this design choice in the conclusion of our review.

The NIC-ICI initiative included four different components: assessment of institutional culture, promoting positive corrections culture, strategic planning and management, and leading and sustaining change. Each initiative was designed as a stand-alone program, and all are short in duration. For example, The "Assessment" initiative is designed to be a 3 to 5 day intervention, promoting positive corrections culture is a 3 day training session, strategic planning and management is designed to vary by site, but is likely to involve between 5 and 15 days (on and off-site), and leading and sustaining change involves approximately 15 days (consulting effort (on/off-site)) per year. While the "dosage" level of each intervention is minimal, several sites received more than one intervention. This natural variation allows the research team to assess the individual and combined effect of these four interventions. Table 1 below highlights site-specific combinations of the four interventions developed for this initiative. Between

September 15, 2003 and September 15, 2005, nine separate sites were selected for one of more

of the four initiatives we evaluate in this report. In addition, NIC is currently in the process of

selecting sites for a new wave of interventions, based on follow-up with the initial pool of

"Assessment Sites", as well as the identification of new sites for one or more ICI interventions.

We should also point out that a distinction has been made by the evaluation team between work

publicly funded by NIC during the study period (9/15/03 and 9/15/05) and work in the exact

same area contracted *privately* with one of the two contractors selected as service providers. Our

evaluation focuses exclusively on those intervention sites (and interventions) funded by NIC.

We address the issues raised by the public/private partnership highlighted in this initiative in the

conclusion of our report.

Table 1: National Institute of Corrections' Institutional Culture Initiative (NIC/ICI) Site Matrix*				
	Assessment	**PPCC**	**Leading and Sustaining Change**	**Strategic Planning**
Site 1	yes	yes	yes	no
Site 2	yes	yes	no	**
Site 3	yes	no	no	no
Site 4	yes	no	yes	no
Site 5	yes	no	no	no
Site 6	yes	no	yes	no
Site 7	yes	no	no	no
Site 8	yes	no	yes	no
Site 9	no	yes	no	no
* includes all sites identified by NIC between September 15, 2003 and September 15, 2005, where NIC-Funded ICI interventions were initiated. However, for three sites included in our review, the initial assessment was actually conducted one year prior to the initiation of our evaluation. (Sites 2,6 and 8) ** no strategic planning initiative was conducted during our evaluation period; this was a pretest site.				

Examination of Table 1 reveals that during our evaluation review period, one site

received three interventions, four sites participated in two interventions, and four sites were

assessment-only sites. However, one of these four sites was the pre-test site for the strategic

planning initiative, which has yet to be initiated. For the purpose of our impact evaluation, there

were actually three initiatives tested at the nine sites highlighted in Table 1: All nine sites were

"assessed" (although only six of these assessments were completed during our review

"window"); three sites received the PPCC training; and four sites were selected for the "leading and sustaining change" initiative. However, we have included the fourth intervention (strategic planning) in our assessment of the level (and quality) of overall program implementation.

Evaluation Design

Our evaluation design included two basic components: an implementation assessment, and an impact evaluation. First, we assessed both the level and quality of implementation for each of the four initiatives developed by NIC, based on our review of available program documentation and our direct on-site observations of these initiatives. The results of this review are needed to answer a basic evaluation question: was each program implemented as designed? It should be obvious to even the casual observer that we can *not* evaluate the "impact" of the NIC initiative unless we have a clear understanding of what *exactly* was implemented under the auspices of "institutional culture". As we discuss in the conclusion of this report, it is critical to examine the linkages between/among program design, implementation level/quality, and the assessment of each program's (and/or combinations of programs) impact.

The figure below depicts the key features of our impact evaluation, which utilizes a pre/post interrupted time series design to examine the impact of each intervention (or intervention combination) on the level of violence and disorder in prison. For each site, a comparison is made (utilizing ARIMA (Auto Regressive Intergraded Moving Average) modeling techniques) between the pattern of incidents at this facility (monthly total incidents; monthly totals, by incident type) during the period *before* the NIC initiative was begun (between 6-12 months depending on data availability at each site), and the period beginning with the start of the first intervention at the facility (the start-up date) and continuing for at least one year. The use of

interrupted time series as a program evaluation strategy is fairly standard; a review of the

evaluation research literature reveals that this method has been used in the past to evaluate a

wide range of criminal justice interventions, including mandatory sentencing, gun control,

intensive probation supervision, and most recently, the "Operation Ceasefire" policing initiative.

While the use of this type of quasi-experimental design does not represent the most <u>rigorous</u>

evaluation design choice available, it was the most appropriate (and rigorous) evaluation design

at our disposal, given (1) the exploratory nature of the intervention, and (2) the amount of

funding available to conduct the evaluation. Nonetheless, we highlight the limitations of our

design choice in the concluding section of this report.

Evaluation Design		
Pre-test ➜	NIC/ICI Interventions ➜	Post-test
⬇		⬇
Staff Perceptions of Culture		Staff Perceptions of Culture
Incidents, Sanctions, Grievances		Incidents, Sanctions, Grievances

Data Collection Procedures

The evaluation of this NIC-ICI required two types of data collection. To evaluate the

initiative definitively, it was critical to measure *both* the *implementation* and the *impact* of each

of NIC's four major strategies. The preference for the evaluation was both a strong

implementation component (including on-site observation, assessment instrument validation,

review of selection process, examination of presenting problems by prison administrators, and

selected interviews with subcontractors involved in each component of the initiative) and a

comprehensive impact evaluation (including collection and review of monthly incidents reports,

disposition/sanction data, offender background data, monthly grievance reports (and

dispositions); and quarterly collection and review of survey data to gauge changes in

staff/management perception of prison culture and prison problems). We describe our data

collection protocol for both types of data collection in the section below:

Objective Measures of Change in Prison Culture: Using a combination of existing data sources (e.g. Census of Federal and State Correctional Facilities, 2000, ACA's survey of riots, disturbances, violence, assaults, and escapes, etc.), the evaluation team developed a protocol to collect and analyze baseline data directly from participating institutions on both the level and rate of prison incidents (including both individual and collective violence by inmates and staff) during the study period. We have collected baseline indicators that will allow us to track the impact of these interventions over time (6-12 months prior to implementation and at least one year after start-up). However, data availability (and data quality) has varied from site to site, which will make it difficult to fully assess the impact of the NIC initiatives at these sites.

Perception Measures of Change in Prison Culture: Since many of the NIC-ICI involve "soft" changes in the culture, we decided to use an approach similar to Liebling (1999), in her study of the "moral performance" of prisons in England to measure the climate and culture within an institution. The most direct methods to do this is through staff and administrative surveys, which can be distributed to a random sample of prison staff on a quarterly basis, beginning (preferably) at the start of the first on-site initiative (Note: sample size varied from site to site, given such factors as facility size and staffing levels; survey administration also varied from site to site for a different set of reasons, which we discuss later in the report). The survey tool includes the following components: 1) CJI version of the Cameron and Quinn Organizational Culture Assessment Inventory – Prisons (OCAI-P); 2) Sweeney and McFarlin (1997) scale of organizational justice to measure procedural justice and distributive justice; and 3) Orthner scale of organizational learning. This instrument, which can be completed in around 20 minutes, was designed to measure staff perception of the culture of the institution during the study period. The data collection plan called for data to be collected quarterly for one year past

the assessment or any NIC-ICI. (Note: site-specific variation in the length/timing of the initial and follow-up survey administration is discussed later in this report).

We anticipate that the ongoing evaluation of NIC's Institutional Culture Initiative will provide critical information to prison managers attempting to successfully "solve" a wide range of seemingly intractable prison problems (interpersonal, intrapersonal, collective, and institutional violence), utilizing one or more of these change strategies. Based on the results of this evaluation, we will have important information, first, on whether the programs were implemented as designed and, second, on whether any one (or combination) of these initiatives can be linked to positive changes in prison culture. The "bottom line" for many will be how evaluators answer the following four questions: as a result of this intervention,

(1) Did interpersonal violence decrease?

(2) Did collective violence decrease?

(3) Did institutional violence decrease?

(4) Did intrapersonal violence decrease?

To answer these questions both the implementation and impact of each of the four initiatives are currently being evaluated. We are hopeful that NIC will be able to determine the logical "next steps" in their ongoing organizational change effort based on the results of our evaluation. In the following section, we offer our preliminary assessment of *each* of these four initiatives, focusing first on level of implementation.

An Assessment of Implementation

In the following section, we highlight our initial findings regarding both the level and quality of implementation for each of the four NIC initiatives. Overall, our review revealed significant problems related to both the level and quality of implementation that NIC will need to address as the move forward with this initiative. Modifications in the design in two of the initiatives (Assessment and PPCC) during the course of the evaluation will make an overall assessment of impact more difficult than we originally anticipated. Perhaps most importantly, our review of implementation underscores the value of clearly *defining the problem* (i.e. developing a problem oriented approach to addressing prison violence and disorder) and then *linking* specific interventions (and intervention combinations) to the problem(s) being addressed. The lack of overall "linkage" between/among these four separate initiatives is a significant design flaw that will need to be addressed before the next wave of culture change initiatives begins. We expand on this recomendation in the conclusion of the report.

1. Assessing Organizational Culture

The National Institute of Corrections selected the Criminal Justice Institute (CJI) to conduct a number of assessments of prison culture throughout the country over the past few years. Assessing institutional culture was designed not only as an individual initiative, but also as the first step of the NIC-ICI process to identify other interventions (e.g. Promoting Positive Prison Culture, Leading and Sustaining Change, Strategic Planning and Management, etc.) that may be suitable for addressing the organizational culture issues. The CJI assessment team (consisting of 4-5 members from various backgrounds and specialties) works onsite at the facility for four days to assess and analyze the culture of a prison including the underlying beliefs and values of staff. One tool that CJI uses to assist in the assessment process is the

Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – Prisons (OCAI-P), a survey consisting of two sets of six questions that asks staff how they feel about the facility currently and then how they would prefer that the facility operate.

Using the assessment tool, the CJI team surveys a number of staff members that serve various functions within the facility, while also interviewing other staff and management directly to develop a balanced view of the organization's culture. Following three days of on-site work, the assessment team presents their findings to prison management and staff, highlighting their assessment of institutional culture and offering their initial recommendations. Based on the response of the institution to this review, one or more of the following culture change strategies may be initiated at the facility: (1) promoting a positive prison culture, (2) strategic planning and management, and (3) leading and sustaining change. The decision on *which* strategy to employ is made by NIC project staff, in conjunction with the warden at each facility (Note: see Appendix C for a depiction of the key decision points in the NIC-ICI project).

However, NIC program developers did not design a specific follow-up protocol for the allocation of subsequent culture-related interventions at assessment sites. Without such basic review criteria, it is difficult to determine *why* some sites were "assessment-only" sites, while other sites received one or more additional services funded through this initiative. Adding to the confusion about site selection for multiple NIC-funded interventions are two factors: first, NIC designated some sites for additional culture-related services using separate technical assistance funds; second, some sites received additional services from the two subcontractors selected for this initiative using separate funding. In both instances, these activities are not included in our implementation review, although they may certainly affect our impact assessment. For the next wave of culture-related NIC initiatives, we strongly recommend that NIC develop explicit

guidelines for linking these initiatives, based on the types of problems identified. In addition, NIC will also need to examine the issues raised when subcontractors assisting in site selection, even in an advisory role, are doing the same work (in this case, culture charge) both publicly and privately.

CJI has conducted dozens of assessments of institutional culture, but only nine of these assessments were conducted in sites included in our two year review (Sept. 15,'03 thru Sept. 15, '05). However, CJI has conducted several other assessments that were funded either through NIC technical assistance funds or privately, using institutional funds. These assessments are not included in the following review, because they are not funded directly through the NIC-ICI initiative. Our review is based on an examination of the assessment reports that CJI provided to these facilities, as well as the observational data collected by the evaluation team doing site visits to several sites during the assessment process. It should also be noted that the decision on whether a particular site would be a NIC/ICI site or a privately funded intervention was unclear.

Presenting Problem:. Table 2 lists the presenting problems provided to NIC by facility administrators to request a cultural assessment. The decision to do a cultural assessment in a particular prison is made by NIC with input from CJI. A comparison of the total requests for assistance (from prison administrators/wardens) and the subgroup of selected sites did not reveal any clear criteria for selection by NIC/CJI (e.g. by presenting problem, source of request – i.e., central office vs. warden). However, interviews with CJI staff revealed that three important criteria were considered: (1) significance of culture issue (e.g. persistence and/or seriousness); (2) diversity of institutional setting (e.g. by security level, size, urban/.rural location, and gender); and (3) the perceived cooperation level of central office and the warden.

Table 2: Requests for Assistance thru the NIC/ICI	
Institution	**Reason for Request**
Site 1	A high level of use of force incidents against inmates.
Site 2	Pervasive staff sexual misconduct at all levels of staff (correctional officers and support staff up to a deputy warden) and racial discrimination and disparate treatment of people of color –African American employees in particular.
Site 3	High rate of positive drug urinalysis tests, staff over-familiarity with inmates, a lack of consistent institutional leadership, low morale and a poor relationship with the Central Office.
Site 4	Problems included a disconnect with Central Office due to minimal visits to the facility by Central Office staff, a high positive rate of inmate drug use, staff over-familiarity with inmates, and a lack of institutional leadership.
Site 5	(1) Recent history of staff sexual misconduct; (2) multiple institutional missions; (3) staff recruitment and retention difficulties; (4) high utilization of overtime by security staff;and (5) acquired a negative reputation as the Department's "problem" institution.
Site 6	(1) Lack of line staff and supervisors' experience I basic correctional philosophy and practice; (2) "Multiple disconnects" between individual units and the institution as a whole; (3) lack of experience and leadership among supervisors; (4) inmate idleness. Site 6 was not initially selected due to its relatively brief history. *It was later selected to pilot test the efficacy of a modified version of the culture assessment protocol and its ability to provide meaningful assistance to relatively newer facilities where the institutional culture had not yet become solidified, and the organization required assistance more in the spirit of 'prevention' and 'early intervention' rather than 'treatment.' NOTE: CJI used abbreviated protocols*
Site 7	**Sited to be in the appendix however the appendix was not attached with the document
Site 8	Staff sexual misconduct at Site 8.
Site 9	High turnover of staff, low staff morale, inmate idleness and violence, and lack of institutional leadership

The On-Site Assessment Process: The CJI plan for assessing a prison requires a team of four to seven consultants to conduct an on-site review for up to four days. Activities include observations, focus groups, administer the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument - Prisons (OCAI-P), assess the culture, and make a presentation to the facility warden. To meet the needs of each institution scheduled to be assessed, CJI selected consultants that had expertise in areas that fit the presenting problems of the institution. Usually CJI staff is supplemented with two outside consultants, including former wardens or correctional officials. It does appear that CJI's reliance on in-house staff, rather than external experts with specific training in ethnographic research (or as sociologists), limited the intended multidisciplinary nature of the on-site assessment process. To obtain a multidisciplinary assessment of prison culture, CJI needs to expand its pool of consultants to include a wider range of backgrounds (psychologists, sociologists, etc.), which was their original strategy for conducting these on-site assessments, according to the review/background materials (Carrol, 2003). The lack of inclusion of external

consultants on the assessment team may have been related to the timing of the on-site

assessment; there may not have been adequate time for CJI to arrange for on-site external

consultants.

      Site Based Materials. Relying on the materials provided by the institutions, CJI provided

an organizational and demographic summary of each institution in their description section of

their reports for each institution. *Table 3* below represents a list of materials provided by each of

the facilities prior to the on-site assessment. The description also provides background

information on some of the issues presented by the institutions.   CJI uses some of the

information in their formal reports to the facilities. For example, mission statements from some

institutions were incorporated into the final report. In these same facilities, the mission and

warden's statements were used as guides to assess if in fact the mission of the organization was

implemented as well as serve as blueprints outlining the direction of the institutions.

      Review of Background Materials by Assessment Team.   A wide range of materials is

requested from each site prior to arrival at each facility. These materials are reviewed by each of

the assessment team members to provide background and context to the on-site assessment

process. To the extent that multidisciplinary assessment teams are employed, these materials are

critical to the review process, because they include both objective indicators of prison

performance in a number of important areas (e.g. incidents, sanctions, inmate/staff grievances,

etc.) and the formal mission statements and operational control strategies of the institution.

These review materials are likely to be viewed differently by individuals from different

backgrounds and professional orientations. Our own review of the materials provided by the six

(6) assessment sites identified significant variation in both the type and quality of background

data provided. While such variation may be inevitable, it certainly affects the subsequent on-site assessment process by the assessment team.

Timing of On-Site Assessments. For the six sites included in our first year review, the length of time between request for assistance and the provision of the actual on-site assessment varied from 6 to 14 months. Significant delay in the provision of this type of "assistance" may have unintended consequences for the assessment team, since for example, the presenting problem may have changed, the prison management team may have changed, and/or the central office's view of the situation may have changed.

Site Visit Protocols. During the site visits, formal and informal interviews were conducted with staff, and focus groups were held to identify cultural issues within the facilities. CJI randomly selected staff to be interviewed in seven of the nine facilities by using the unit/staff schedules provided by the institutions. It is unknown how the staff was selected to participate in the facilities that did not provide these schedules. Formal focus groups are held with the selected employees. Informal meetings are held when CJI's assessment team walks through the facility and talks with staff. The Assessment Team attempts to include staff from all shifts working in the facility in the informal and formal meetings.

Table 3: Contacts and Requested Materials Per Institution

Institution	(Contact) Step 1	(Contact) Step 2	Materials Requested
Site 1	Telephone Conversation with CJI and officials from Site 1	Telephone conversation with same individuals and institution's warden	• Mission • Significant incidents • Program and services • Monthly climate reports • Unit schedules • Longevity reports • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Other institutional data specifically requested by CJI
Site 2	Telephone conversation between Criminal Justice Institute (CJI) and Dept of Corr. Commissioner to request institutional materials.	Telephone conversation with CJI, the Warden Deputy commissioner District Administrator.	• Mission • Significant incidents • Programs and services • Monthly climate reports • Use of force incident reports • Unit schedules • Longevity reports • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Inmate and staff grievance reports • Closed and active lawsuit summaries and other institutional data
Site 3	Day long meeting with DOC Secretary and wardens and deputy wardens of facilities	CJI project director was given a brief tour of the facility	• Mission • Programs and services • Daily count and management reports • Use of force incident reports • Unit Schedules • Staff recruitment and retention summaries • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Staff grievance reports • Other basic statistical information
Site 4	Day long meeting with DOC Secretary and wardens and deputy wardens of facilities	CJI project director was given a brief tour of the facility	• Mission • Programs and services • Daily count and management reports • Use of force incident summaries • Staff recruitment and retention summaries • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Staff grievance reports • Other basic statistical information

Table 3(continued): Contacts and Requested Materials Per Institution			
Institution	(Contact) Step 1	(Contact) Step 2	Materials Requested
Site 5	CJI met with the commissioner.	Telephone conference with CJI, DOC Director of Facilities, Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, Chief of Security, and Casework Supervisor.	• Mission • Programs and services • Inmate incident and disciplinary reports • Staff schedules • Staffing analysis • Statistical summaries • Inmate grievance reports • Other basic facility information
Site 6	CJI had a telephone conversation with the DOC Secretary	CJI had a telephone discussion with the Superintendent	• Mission • Programs and services • Monthly climate reports • Use of force incident reports • Unit schedules • Longevity reports • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Inmate and staff grievance reports • Closed and active lawsuit summaries • Other institutional data
Site 7	Conference call with CJI , DOC Director, Acting Warden		• Mission • Programs and services • Daily count and management reports • Use of force incident reports • Unit schedules • Staff recruitment and retention summaries • Staff grievance reports • Other basic statistical information
Site 8	Conference call with CJI, CDC director, other representatives of CDC, CIW warden, Chief deputy warden and chief medical officer.		• Mission • Programs and services • Daily count and management reports • Use of force incident reports • Unit schedules • Staff recruitment and retention summaries • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Staff grievance reports • Other basic statistical information
Site 9	Conference call with CJI, DOC commissioner, various representatives of DOC regional office, the superintendent, and the administrative assistant.		• Mission • Programs and services • Daily count and management reports • Use of force incident summaries • Staff recruitment and retention summaries • Staff injury reports • Staff promotion/transfer summaries • Staff grievance reports • Other basic statistical information • RECEIVED: DOC institutional review report and a comprehensive summary of his particular areas of concern and his respective remedies.

Focus Groups. Focus group participants included wardens, managers, non-custody and custody staff and inmates. Separate focus groups were held for staff and a small number of inmates. Female staff members also may have separate focus groups from male staff members, although this varies from assessment to assessment. The focus groups for staff members were organized by the participants' rank and shift times. CJI team members conducted the focus groups with the purpose of administering the OCAI-P and have discussions with the participants about their perspective of what the prevailing issues are within the institution. The focus groups provide a mechanism for CJI to learn more about the culture and climate in the institution including leadership, communication, decision-making, presenting problems, inmate related issues, staff related issues, and so on.

To be part of the focus groups, CJI attempts to randomly select participants. Attendees were randomly selected by CJI from the staff records provided by the institution. Attempts were made to hold the focus groups in a controlled setting where each participant received verbal instructions on how to accurately complete the OCAI-P and could discuss the issues freely. The number of focus groups as well as the number of participants varied from site to site. For instance, in one facility, a special focus group was formed entirely of female correctional officers to "ensure that the voices of female staff were adequately represented."

Selection of Participants. Selection of Participants for focus groups appeared appropriate for staff. However, the size of the focus groups needs to be expanded for two basic reasons: (1) sample size is too small, resulting in a very high margin of error for survey results (20% or higher); (2) confidentiality concerns are heightened when the administration contacts focus group participants directly and when only a small number of staff are selected.

Table 4 below contains the number of CJI team members and the number of site visits for each institution. The table also enumerates the various focus groups that were formed for each institution, the number of participants in each group, and the number of surveys administered in the institution.

		Table 4: Focus Group/Survey Protocol			
Institution	Number of CJI team Members	Number of Focus Groups Conducted (enumerate)	Number in each focus group	Number of Surveys administered during focus groups	Number of Site Visit Days
Site 1	4	**Managers** ▪ Day Watch custody Officers ▪ Evening watch custody officers ▪ Mixed (support/line staff) ▪ Custody Supervisors ▪ Additional dept. heads/unit mangers ▪ Inmate *(7)*	15-Jul	**69 staff representing 361 FT staff members**	3.5
Site 2	5 + 2 NIC staff	▪ Managers ▪ Second shift security officers ▪ First shift security officers ▪ Mixed support/line staff ▪ Security supervisors ▪ Captains/unit managers ▪ Inmates (2) *(8)*	12-Apr	**48 staff representing 502 FT staff members**	3
Site 3	4	▪ Managers ▪ Second shift security officers ▪ First shift security officers ▪ Mixed support/line staff ▪ Security supervisors ▪ Captains/unit managers ▪ Inmates (2) *(7)*	14-Apr	**54 staff, 39 are from line staff.**	4
Site 4	4	▪ Security Officers ▪ Mixed support/line staff ▪ First shift security officers ▪ Second shift security officers ▪ Management/administrators ▪ Inmates (2) *(7)*	-	**351 staff members**	4
Site 5	4	▪ Security Supervisors ▪ Mixed non-security line staff ▪ Security officers (3) ▪ Managers ▪ Female security officers ▪ Inmates (2) *(9)*	13-May	**48 representing 96 employees 37 are from line staff. The female only focus group did not receive the survey.**	4
Site 6	2	▪ Managers ▪ First shift security officers ▪ Mixed support/line staff ▪ Second shift security officers ▪ Security Supervisors ▪ Inmates *(6)*	17-Aug	**62 staff representing 550 employees 39 are from line staff.**	2.5
Site 7	6	▪ Correctional Officers (day and evening) ▪ Non correctional officer line staff ▪ Sergeants ▪ Administrators ▪ Inmates (2) *(7)*	15-Oct	**62 staff**	4
Site 8	7	▪ Security supervisors ▪ Correctional services line staff ▪ Mixed support/line staff ▪ Female security officer ▪ Male security officers ▪ Administrators ▪ Inmates (2) *(8)*	14-Apr	**52 staff**	4
Site 9	7	▪ Security supervisors (sergeants) ▪ Mixed support/line staff ▪ First shift security officers ▪ Third shift security officers ▪ Management/administrators ▪ Inmates (2) *(7)*	15-Oct	**63 staff**	4

OCAI-P. The assessment instrument used by CJI is a modified version of the well-respected and public domain tool developed by Cameron and Quinn, titled the *Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI)*. CJI went through an extensive review process to select an assessment tool to be used as part of this review process; Dr. Ken Cameron was an advisor to CJI and recommended the tool that he and Quinn developed for private sector agencies.   With permission from the authors, CJI adapted this assessment to be used in correctional settings primarily in the prison system by creating the *Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – Prison (OCAI-P). CJI altered the* language of the instrument to make it applicable to correctional institutions. Like the OCAI, the OCAI-P assesses the profile of organizations along a continuum representing competing values: stability and control versus flexibility and discretion, and internal versus external focus. The OCAI-P along with interviews and observations were used to illustrate the relationships of subcultures within an organization. It is believed that understanding the relationships in the organization may help in addressing specific problems in the institution.

The OCAI-P is designed to identify competing values in an institution where the current and desired state are not the same. It is a tool to assist in the assessment process that provides information to CJI how the degree to which the values of the institution and the fit with the individuals who work in that institution are in agreement. According to CJI, since the concept of a culture reflects "the system of values, beliefs and norms held in common by a group of people, the tool identifies the degree to which this occurs through reporting the scores in each dimension as well as the degree to which the current and desired state are similar" (quote from CJI assessment report).

The OCAI-P produces a profile of the institution's current and preferred culture types formed by surveying six distinct characteristics of the organization: 1) Dominant characteristics – what the overall prison organization is like; 2) organizational leadership – the style and approach of the administration including the warden; 3) management – how employees are treated by their supervisors/management; 4) organizational glue – bonding mechanisms that hold the organization together; 5) strategic emphasis – the mission and vision that drive the prison's strategy; and 6) success criteria – how success is defined, and what gets rewarded and celebrated. IT should be noted that the instrument does NOT provide a score for each of these constructs but rather presents a score for the culture such as

- 'Family' –focuses on internal maintenance with flexibility, concern for people, and sensitivity to customers;
- 'Dot com' –focuses on external positioning with a high degree of flexibility and individuality;
- 'Market' – focuses on external positioning with a need for stability and control; and
- 'Hierarchy' –focuses on internal maintenance with a need for stability and control-- culture types.

CJI presented the results of the OCAI-P in a graph form to help illustrate the organizations' values. These graphs depicted the differences between the staffs' feelings of how the culture within the facility currently is, and how they feel the culture of the facility should be in the future. This assessment allows the organization to identify areas where they need to change and areas where they may be on par with how the staff feels.

Reliability of the OCAI. Quinn and Sprietzer have tested the reliability of the OCAI. In their study, 796 executives from 86 different public firms were asked to rate their own organization's culture. The results indicated that the "respondents tended to rate their organization's culture consistently across the various questions on the instrument." Another

study conducted by Yueng, Brockbank, and Ulrich also showed the reliability of the OCAI instrument in a study conducted in 1991 that gathered data on the organizational culture of 1064 businesses most of which were Fortune 500 companies. Reliability studies of the OCAI found that the results were very satisfactory compared to normal standards of reliability. However, no studies to date have examined the reliability of the OCAI-P in prison settings.

Reliability and Validity of Survey Instrument. (OCAI-P) used for focus group participants is affected by a number of factors including sample size, and the instructions given to survey respondents. Attempts by the evaluation team to validate the instrument on a separate sample of staff members (and management) at each site who were not assigned to one of the focus groups revealed that difference in how the survey is administered (e.g. how the term "current" is defined) may affect how the participants complete the survey.

Use of the Instrument as Part of the Assessment Process. CJI uses the instrument as part of the focus groups where the staff are asked to complete the instrument in a group setting. Some of the time there is a discussion of select items, other times the group completes the instrument and then holds the focus group. For the most part, the instrument is used to open discussions in the focus group. It should be noted that CJI does vary its operational definition of what timeframe should be referenced to assess the "current" state of a particular facility. In some cases, they have instructed the staff to go back six or more months in their assessment of the "current state" (e.g. to coincide with when the presenting problem occurred). By varying the instructions given for completing the OCAI-P survey instrument, the contractors make cross-site comparisons of the assessment process akin to an apples/oranges comparison. Even ignoring this problem for the moment, there are serious problems with both the administration of the survey

(e.g. sample size, staff selection process, exclusion of staff responses that don't "fit", as outliers) and the analysis and presentation of survey responses that must be addressed. In particular, our analysis of the concurrence rates used to highlight the key findings of the review team revealed very large standard errors of estimate (see table below), which suggests that the evaluation team may be presenting a very inaccurate "portrait" of the culture of these institutions. Much more rigorous sampling procedures need to be employed if these estimates are to be used as part of the culture assessment process.

PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF CONCURRENCE RATES AT THE 68% AND 95% LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE

Test Site	Valid Instruments	Concurrence Rate	Error Term*	68% Interval	95% Interval
#1	63	71%	5.5%	65.5%-76.5%	60.0%-82.0%
#2	52	79%	5.5%	73.5%-84.5%	68.0%-90.0%
#3	119	57%	4.5%	52.5%-61.5%	48.0%-66.0%
#4	61	55%	6.5%	48.5%-61.5%	42.0%-68.0%
#5	52	68%	6.5%	61.5%-74.5%	55.0%-81.0%
#6	50	63%	7.0%	56.0%-70.0%	49.0%-77.0%
#7	54	68%	6.5%	61.5%-74.5%	55.0%-81.0%
#8	96	42%	5.0%	37.0%-47.0%	32.0%-52.0%
#9	48	79%	6.0%	73.0%-85.0%	67.0%-91.0%
#10	62	59%	6.0%	53.0%-65.0%	47.0%-71.0%
#11	47	74%	6.5%	67.5%-80.5%	61.0%-87.0%
#12	53	74%	6.0%	68.0%-80.0%	62.0%-86.0%
#13	69	75%	5.0%	70.0%-80.0%	65.0%-85.0%
#14	58	56%	6.5%	49.5%-62.5%	43.0%-69.0%
#15	42	69%	7.0%	62.0%-76.0%	55.0%-83.0%
#16	53	58%	7.0%	51.0%-65.0%	44.0%-72.0%
#17	59	53%	6.5%	46.5%-59.5%	40.0%-66.0%

- Error term rounded to nearest half percent ; Standard Error Algorithm – *PxQ/n, square root of where P = concurrence rate*

Individual Interviews. CJI team members conducted individual interviews with staff that ranged in rank from line staff, to support staff (food service, medical, educational staff), to administration. These interviews were informal to allow the staff to freely raise issues of concern. The purpose of the individual interviews are to validate the issues raised in the focus groups as well as to identify new issues that are of concern to the staff. The CJI team conducted interviews with staff that were identified by their colleagues as having strong opinions whether positive or negative about the facility. Through these interviews, team members learn about informal controls in the prison such as who the staff perceives is in charge or who exerts more influence in the facility.

Culturegram. A major product of the assessment is a culturegram of each institution created by CJI. This diagram is designed by CJI to illustrate the relationships that exist within institutions as well as how much influence these relationships have on its culture. It assists with portraying and understanding the competing values of various groups and subcultures, and the influencing parties that affect operations of the facility. The relationships within the facility are represented in the diagram through symbols (mostly spheres) that connect or disconnect with one another representing how the degree to which the cultural beliefs within the facility are similar. For example, the CJI assessment team members attempted to ascertain how cultures and subcultures were formed within their institutions according to role, the influence of each group and their impact on the organization (i.e., front-line staff, administration, sergeants, captains, inmates, etc.). The CJI team described these groups using the terminology of the facility's staff (e.g., 'goldbrickers'- those staff who are only working towards their retirement).

The CJI team created a culturegram for each facility at the end of the assessment to summarize their findings and to discuss during the pre-closeout meeting. The culturegram is the collective view of the institution; evaluators' observation of this process found some variation in how the culturegram was created with a CJI employee doing the first draft and another when the team put together the draft. Overall, the use of the culturegram by the assessment team appears to be highly subjective with no formal criteria for graphically depicting the interaction of various subgroups within the prison culture.

Close-Out/Assessment Recommendations. The information gleaned from assessment process results in an on-site presentation conducted by CJI and a subsequent report that summarizes the findings (the timing of the full report's release varied from site to site). Some of the reports also include recommendations for the facility, others did not include such recommendations. Overall, the CJI team tends to find that most of the institutions scored higher in the hierarchy dimension of the OCAI-P. Many of the staff within the assessed institutions felt that there was poor leadership in their organizations. They felt as though their organizations would be better off if communication and some of the characteristics of the 'family' culture simultaneously increased while the outside influence of other groups (i.e., the market culture) decreased. However, the use of the OCAI-P survey data in the close-out and in the final assessment is problematic, due to the broad parameter estimates we identified in our review of concurrence rates at selected sites. The strength of the on-site assessment is the qualitative data collected in focus groups, informal discussions, and the observations made by team members while on-site.

Of the nine institutions assessed, CJI made recommendations for only five (See Table 5), but these recommendations did not identify—by design—the specific NIC/ICI follow up

strategies that might be appropriate at these facilities. Once again we must emphasize that this appears to be a critical design flaw that must be addressed, because a clear linkage is needed between the assessment and all possible combinations of follow up interventions. The recommendations were generic, general in scope, and did not identify specific strategies to address problems.   It focused mainly on the institutions' impending challenges for change, if change ultimately could/would occur within the institution, and their capacity for success.   For instance, CJI recommendations included the creation of a planning committee that should include stakeholders, central office administrators, the warden, CJI assessment team leader and the NIC project manager. In addition, they recommended that changes should be made gradually and for the institutions to celebrate every success attained. Unfortunately, the assessment reports do <u>not</u> provide follow-up problem-solving strategies for the administration to improve their current situation.

Table 5: Summary of CJI Assessment Team Recommendation		
Institution	**Reason for Request**	*Challenges, Strengths, and Recommendations*
Site 1	High rate of positive drug urinalysis tests, staff over-familiarity with inmates, a lack of consistent institutional leadership, low morale and a poor relationship with the Central Office.	*Prerequisites*: (1) Central and regional office support; (2) Technical assistance *Approach*: (1) Planning; (2) Inclusion; (3) Incremental change; (4) Good news – bad news; (5) Top-down role modeling *Assets*: (1) Location and physical plant; (2) Safety and Security; (3) Cultural compatibility; (4) Staff professionalism; (5) Commitment of new administration; (6) Hopefulness
Site 2	Problems included a disconnect with Central Office due to minimal visits to the facility by Central Office staff, a high positive rate of inmate drug use, staff over-familiarity with inmates, and a lack of institutional leadership.	*Prerequisites*: (1) Address demoralization and lack of trust first; (2) Enhance internal communication and consistency *Approach*: (1) Planning; (2) Inclusion; (3) Gradual change – start with small "wins"; (4) Good news – bad news; (5) Communication; Top-down role modeling *Assets*: (1) New Leadership; (2) Open to change; (3) Detroit; (4) Safe environment; (5) Mutual respect (staff and inmates); (6) Experienced workforce; (7) Collaboration; (8) Hope and faith
Site 3	(1) Recent history of staff sexual misconduct; (2) multiple institutional missions; (3) staff recruitment and retention difficulties; (4) high utilization of overtime by security staff; and (5) acquired a negative reputation as the Department's "problem" institution.	*Prerequisites*: (1) Gain support from Headquarters; (2) Separate administration's internal and external responsibilities; (3) Avoid top-down micromanagement of change *Approach*: (1) Planning; (2) Inclusion; (3) Gradual Change (Start with Small "Wins"); (4) "Good news-bad news"; (5) Communication; (6) Top-down role modeling. *Assets*: (1) Commitment; (2) New Leadership; (3) Flexibility; (4) Adaptability; (5) Camaraderie; (6) Perseverance; (7) Safe Environment; (8) Untapped Resources
Site 4	Staff sexual misconduct at the facility.	*Prerequisites*: (1) Address staff trauma; (2) Gain central office support; (3) Utilize technical assistance *Approach*: (1) Planning; (2) Inclusion; (3) Gradual change –start with small "wins"; (4) "Good news-bad news"; (5) Communication; (6) Top-down role modeling *Assets*: (1) Commitment; (2) Pride and Quality; (3) Professionalism; (4) Resilience; (5) Safety; (6) Opportunity; (7) Leadership; (8) Hopefulness
Site 5	High turnover of staff, low staff morale, inmate idleness and violence, and lack of institutional leadership	*Prerequisites*: (1) Address demoralization and lack of trust first; (2) Enhance communication and consistency *Approach*: (1) Planning; (2) Inclusion; (3) Gradual Change – start with small "wins"; (4) Good news-bad news; (5) Communication; (6) Top-down role modeling *Assets*: (1) Leadership/Vision; (2) Change process well underway; (3) Proper Inmates/Classification; (4) Improving communication; (5) Offender programs; Facility's reputation improving; (6) White hats getting on board; (7) Cautious Optimism

As we have already noted, in all nine reports, there was a strong emphasis on the concurrence rates. Concurrence rates were derived from staffs' responses to the OCAI-P instrument. The survey measures current and preferred cultures, and these two views were compared to see where the overlap exists for differences and similarities. The amount of overlap that appears is the agreement between the culture that already exists in an institution and what staff prefers the culture to be in the future. In addition to the sampling and analysis issues we have already raised, another concern with this methodology is that the 'preferred' culture does not mean it is the correct or ideal culture for that institution. It clearly fails to distinguish whether the 'preferred' culture is the ideal culture that will resolve the problems for that specific institution or whether the 'current' culture is actually doing the institution a disservice by perpetuating the presenting problems identified by the administration.

Another illustration was the comparison of the family culture type and the hierarchy culture type. For example, in one report we reviewed, there was a radical shift between what is 'current' –having a dominant hierarchy culture type, to the 'preferred' –having a more family culture type. Does this mean having a more family oriented culture in this institution would resolve the presenting problems of the institution as defined in the request for the assessment? Even if this methodology did identify what type of culture was preferred, it was not designed to assess what organizational cultural change(s) would effectively address the underlying issues. Once again, there is a need to restructure the recommendations made in conjunction with the culture assessment and to frame a "problem-oriented" response.

The culturegram is a useful tool but its validity is open to discussion. Since the CJI team used staff terminology to describe the culture of the institutions varies across the reports, it makes it difficult to assess the culturegrams.

2. Promoting Positive Corrections Culture

Promoting Positive Corrections Culture is designed as a 3-day training session to teach prison staff about organizational culture; in the process, participants will examine (and learn about) the organizational culture of their own prison. According to program developers, the overall goal of this course is to provide staff at the facility an opportunity to assess their culture and then begin to formulate a plan to improve it. Once a "core group" of staff is trained, they are then responsible for disseminating the information throughout the facility to other staff. Staff will attempt to identify and write a mission statement for the facility, identify their current and desired values and beliefs, and develop a strategy for improving the culture to attain their desired outcomes and monitoring progress towards those goals. This relatively short intervention strategy (3 Days) can be viewed as one step in a long-term organizational change process.

This curriculum has been well-received by NIC and it has been used both as a follow-up to assessment and to introduce the "culture" issue to many institutions. The curriculum has undergone several changes, especially as a result of feedback by a set of trainers that were trained to "deliver" the training (i.e. a train the trainers program). Additionally, the curriculum has been used in several different ways—to begin the change readiness process, to train trainers within a prison setting, and to assist wardens in beginning to consider a new vision for their organization. There are a number of merits to this curriculum regarding its use as a tool to prepare the wardens for the change process. However, as in any short intervention that is geared as a training mechanism, the lack of a follow-up protocol and procedure limits the utility of the current strategy (e.g. because it assumes wardens to know how to proceed next, requires the warden to have facilitation skills, etc.).

One of the core components of the PPCC is the use of a survey instrument, the Organizational Culture Inventory (or OCI), to assess (or profile) the culture of the institution. According to the developers of this instrument (Cooke and Lafferty, Human Synergistics, 2003), twelve distinct culture styles can be identified using the instrument. These twelve "styles" fall into three general style categories: constructive cultures, passive/defensive cultures, and aggressive/defensive cultures. To the extent that a particular institution's staff members describe their organization as either aggressive/defensive or passive/defensive, recognition of the organization's lack of constructive styles is viewed as the first step in the organizational change process (and movement toward one of the four constructive styles identifies by OCI developers).

The main problem with relying on the OCI is that there is no independent evaluation of the instrument's reliability and validity with corrections organizations available (Scott, Mannion, Davines, and Marshall, 2003). With only a few exceptions, evaluations that have been conducted to date have been funded through Human Synergistics (see, e.g. Cook and Lafferty, 1987), which obviously has a stake in promoting its product. One exception was a study of the use of the OCI instrument to study the link between culture and organizational performance in manufacturing organizations (Corbett and Rastrick, 1999), where no clear relationship was identified between any of the three broad culture styles (constructive, passive/defensive, and aggressive/defensive) and a variety of organizational quality performance measures. This is a critical finding with obvious implications for culture change initiatives that use staff/management "scores" on the OCI instrument as the starting point in a long-term organizational change process. Even if the OCI is determined to provide an accurate profile of the culture of corrections organizations (at this point, we don't know), there is no evidence that

there is likely to be a direct link between style change and organizational performance. In fact, the independent evidence that is available suggests the opposite.

3. Strategic Planning and Management

Strategic Planning and Management is a third initiative designed to affect change within the culture of a correctional facility. The purpose of this initiative is to provide staff of the facility with an opportunity to create a strategic plan or "map" of responses by the facility to different situations, or problems within the prison, and then to assist in the development of an action plan designed to change the culture of the selected facility. This strategy was designed to allow each facility to develop their own policies and procedures and their own mission/vision statements about where they want the facility to go and how they plan to get there. Following the creation of a planning team (representing all facets of employment within the facility), staff identify a specific strategic planning process/model, develop a response methodology, prepare a guide for staff and develop an evaluation process to monitor any progress made. The project is designed to (1) familiarize the staff with the "tools and techniques" of strategic planning and management, and (2) assist in the implementation of a concrete action plan targeting problems related to prison culture. The duration (and intensity) of this initiative has not been predetermined, but it is expected that project staff will be on-site for "blocks" of days over several months. No site was selected for this initiative during the first two years of the project. However, NIC has selected a site for the third year of the initiative. Without a specific site to review, we can not assess either the level or quality of implementation of this initiative.

4. Leading and Sustaining Change

One final strategy that is available through the NIC-ICI is *The Leading and Sustaining Change, initiative*. This strategy's purpose is to develop the skills and competencies for change in the specific leadership at a facility. This strategy is designed to provide the leadership (e.g. warden, assistant warden, etc.) with an advisor to help craft responses to management issues; in many instances, this program will be a follow-up to the completion of an on-site assessment of institutional culture. In these prisons, a "change advisor" will serve as an outside consultant to the warden at select facilities to assist leadership in changing the organization's culture. The change advisor (in conjunction with leadership) will identify areas that staff need assistance and select approaches that will help increase staff's understanding and competencies. The overall goal of this initiative is the development of a fuller understanding of the culture within the prison and the implementation of a "plan of action" to move the prison towards their desired goals. This strategy requires the directors, wardens/superintendents, executive team members, and staff supervisors (captains, lieutenants, sergeants) to be involved in this process. This strategy was designed to work with only those facilities that are ready and have expressed a willingness to change their culture and is a good example of a "top-down" change strategy. The four selected prisons with change advisors have their expertise for approximately 10 to 15 days a year. The change advisors complete their work with the warden and "change team" via on-site activities, telephone follow-up, and report preparation.

Interviews were conducted with the change advisors to learn about their activities and efforts *(Note: a summary of these interviews is included in Appendix A)*. The phone interviews revealed that the selected change advisors were well-experienced, had a variety of experience in working with a number of organizations (although none had prior experience with prisons or

correctional institutions), and observed that the issues are similar to other large organizations. The change advisors noted that their limited role affected the type of problems they could address with the wardens. They also noted that the designation of a change "advisor", instead of a facilitator, restricts their role in these institutions. Change advisors at several sites observed that they needed more time on-site at the outset of the change process in order to familiarize themselves with the unique "culture" of the institution (e.g. its history, watershed events, unique language, symbols, etc.), in part due to the time between the initial assessment by CJI and the initiation of this particular initiative. Finally, our review of the types of problems addressed during the "leading and sustaining change initiative" suggests that the change advisors may need help in both problem identification and the development of "best practice", evidence-based intervention strategies.

An Assessment of the Impact of NIC's Institutional Culture Initiative

In the following section, we review the key components of our "impact" evaluation. We begin by describing data collection activities (to date), and then we provide an overview of the method of analysis utilized in our impact assessment. Initial findings are highlighted, focusing on (1) changes in staff perceptions of institutional culture, and (2) changes in the incident levels reported at selected impact sites during the pre-test, post-test review period.

Data and Method: As we noted earlier in our review, two separate data collection efforts were undertaken during this evaluation. First, we collected objected data on the number of reported incidents at each prison, the types of sanctions that were imposed for each incident type (e.g. violence, disorder, etc.), and where available, inmate (and staff) grievances. The collection of these data involved gaining permission from individual prison and/or statewide data systems

after careful attention to human subjects/confidentiality issues. Importantly, no individual-level, offender-specific identifiers are included in our data file. In all our analyses of these objective data, the unit of analysis is the incident, the sanction, and/or the grievance, rather than a particular offender. Table 6 below summarizes our data collection efforts; to date, we have collected data on these objective indicators from these seven sites, and we will begin data collection at the two remaining sites in the next three months. Although pre-test data collection, coding, and analysis is complete at several sites, we are still in the process of collecting post-test (or post-intervention) data at several sites, due to a variety of factors, including: (1) intervention start-up dates, (2) data availability, (3) state-level evaluation review/human subjects protection protocol, and (4) the decision of one site to "pull-out" of the culture change initiative.

Table 6: Data Collection Activities for On-Going ICI
Evaluation: September 15, 2003 thru September 15, 2005

	Objective Data Collection*		Survey Data Collection**		
	Pretest Data	**Post-Test Data**	**Time 1**	**Time 2**	**Time 3**
Site 1	1987 incidents/sanctions	4458 incidents	na	na	40 staff
	106 grievances	na			surveys
Site 2	in progress	na	88 Staff	41 Staff	15 Upper-level
	in progress	na	surveys	surveys	Staff surveys
Site 3	224 incidents	176 incidents	25 staff	na	na
	217 grievances	103 grievances	surveys		
Site 4	566 incidents	na	93 staff	101 staff	73 staff
	na	na	surveys	surveys	surveys
Site 5	269 incidents	na	46 staff	31 staff	na
	na	na	surveys	surveys	
Site 6	474 incidents/sanctions	na	na	na	na
	170 grievances	na			
Site 7	463 incidents/sanctions	na	na	na	na
	105 grievances	na			
Site 8	Data Collection Protocol		--	--	--
	Being Developed				
Site 9	Data Collection Protocol		98 staff	--	--
	Being Developed		surveys		

NA = Not Available. At Sites 1, 6 and 8 initial assessment occurred before evaluation began. At Site 3 no time 2 or time 3 data could be collected due to institutional resistance. At Site 5 no time 3 surveys were conducted due to institutional resistance.

`-- = data not scheduled to be collected

* = data not received by evaluations as of September 15, 2005

** = we are currently collecting staff perception data at three sites only one site (site 7) has not continued with ICI, while 2 other sites have just recently been added to the ICI (sites 8 and 9).

In addition to objective data collection, we are also in the process of collecting survey data from prisons on staff (and management) perceptions of prison culture. To examine the impact of the initiative on <u>changes</u> in staff perceptions over time, we designed a survey protocol that calls for administering the surveys –on site – on a quarterly basis (beginning –whenever possible – in the first month of the initiative). A review of table 6 reveals that we have been less successful collecting staff perception data that objective (incident, sanction data). Nonetheless, data are available to examine staff perceptions of culture at six sites.

These survey data are less complete than we anticipated, due to difficulties associated with gathering a random sample of staff from existing agency staffing lists, and problems related to administering the survey on-site during an <u>ongoing</u> NIC culture change initiative. Despite the data collection shortfalls we have described, it is still possible to offer a preliminary assessment of the "impact" of the NIC initiatives on both staff perceptions of culture, and the number of reported incidents during the pre-post period.

The method of analysis we use to examine changes in staff perceptions at selected review points (Time 1 (start date), Time 2 (approximately 4 months after start-up), and Time 3 (4 months after time 2 review)) is a t-Test for significant differences (p<.05) in the average scores (×) given by survey responses to each of the four culture dimensions included in the OCAI-P survey instrument: family, Dot.Com, Market, and Hierarchy. Our analysis of pre-test, post-test changes in the number of incidents (monthly) at each prison uses an ARIMA modeling technique that is appropriate for this type of multiple intervention, interrupted time series analysis. Separate ARIMA models will be developed and tested for each intervention site. Since sites vary not only in the number of interventions employed (one, two, or three), but also in the length

and timing of the pre-test, post-intervention period, we will be able to examine the impact of these design decisions on our objective outcome measures: incidents, sanctions, and grievances.

The Impact of the NIC Institutional Culture Change Initiative on Staff Perceptions of Prison Culture

We highlight the results of our initial review of changes of staff perceptions of prison culture in the table below. In the first site we examined, two separate change initiatives were introduced: Assessment, and Leading and Sustaining Change. Both of these interventions had been initiated by the time of our time 3 review (July, 2005), so it is at this point that we would anticipate the largest "overall" effect (T1 vs. T3 mean differences) of the combined intervention. Surprisingly, the only statistically significant difference in mean scores between T1 and T3 was in staff perceptions of the family dimension, which appeared to diminish in importance over time. During this same one year period, staff perceived the culture becoming more hierarchical. Since there is no evidence that either dimension is associated with improved organizational performance, we are limited in the inferences we can draw here about organizational culture and organizational change.

Further examination of the table below reveals that for site 2 (an assessment only site), no statistically significant differences were found between the mean scores of survey respondents at time 1 (October, 2004), and time 2 (May, 2005), although at this site it appears that the organization was becoming less hierarchical and more "like a family" over time. Since only one intervention was introduced at this site, one possibility that initial improvements following assessment were diminishing over time; if we had conducted follow-up surveys a few months earlier at this site, we may have identified the initial effect.) However, small sample sizes (N=46, T1; N=31, T2) are a more likely explanation for the findings reported here. Overall, our

preliminary analyses do not offer strong, initial support for the hypothesis that the intervention(s) introduced at these two sites resulted in significant changes in staff perceptions of the importance of the four culture dimensions measured using the OCAI-P instrument. Obviously, these analyses are preliminary and should not be viewed as evidence that the initiative doesn't work; but it does engender speculation.

Changes In Staff Perceptions of Current Organizational Culture						
Type of Culture	**Site 1: Mean Scores***			Significance Test		
	Time 1	**Time 2**	**Time 3**	**T1,T2**	**T1,T3**	**T2,T3**
	May-04	**Sep-04**	**Jul-05**			
Family	118.05	116.16	100.62	NS	p<.05	NS
Dot.com	102.9	85.55	104.77	p<.01	NS	p<.05
Market	157.13	155.51	150.53	NS	NS	NS
Hierarchy	219.52	239.75	240.42	NS	NS	NS
Sample Size	**(n=93)**	**(n=101)**	**(n=73)**			

*This site utilized the following 2 change strategies: Assessment, and Leading and Sustaining Change

Type of Culture	Site 2: Mean Scores*		Significance Test
	Time 1	**Time 2**	T1,T2
	Oct-04	**May-05**	
Family	118.24	132.32	NS
Dot.com	82.15	97.45	NS
Market	132.93	136.06	NS
Hierarchy	226.85	188.87	NS
Sample Size	**(n=46)**	**(n=31)**	

*This site utilized the following change strategy: Assessment

The Impact of the NIC Institutional Culture Change Initiative on Violence and Disorder in Prison

Trend pre/post implementation phases

A trend analysis of total incidents at Site 1 during the 23-month period from May 2003 to March 2005 shows a drop in inmate misconduct immediately following the implementation of each new phase of the ICI. For example, the mean number of reported incidents per month for the 6 months immediately preceding the assessment stage of the project was 351.2. The mean

dropped to 292.3 in the 6 months immediately following the assessment, and decreased even further to 240.8 in the 8 months following implementation of PPCC. Figure 1 presents the trend line for the number of total incidents by month.

Total Incidents - Pre-Post Comparison*

*November 2003 –Assessment of Institutional Culture
January 2004 – Leading and Sustaining Change
August 2004 – Promoting a Positive Corrections Culture

A similar view of the data for violent incidents only shows a pattern that appears relatively unchanged through the implementation period. The mean number of violent incidents prior to assessment was 44.2. That figure increased slightly, but not significantly, after assessment to 50.2 and then levels off in late 2004/early 2005 at an average of 41.25 violent incidents reported per month.

Violent Incidents - Pre-Post Comparison

*November 2003 –Assessment of Institutional Culture
January 2004 – Leading and Sustaining Change
August 2004 – Promoting a Positive Corrections Culture

Similar trend analyses were not performed for other sub-categories of incidents (such as property offenses, drug/contraband possession, or sex offenses) since the numbers of such incidents were typically very low overall and, commonly, several months had zero such offenses. Also, administrative violations, which make up the bulk of the total incidents reported at this facility, were not separated out due to the redundancy in analyzing these infractions and total incidents simultaneously. The trends for administrative violations and total offenses mirror one another, thus there is no need to review each separately. (See Figure 3 for a graph of administrative violations and note the similarity to total offenses from Figure 1)

Administrative Violations – Pre-Post Comparison

*November 2003 –Assessment of Institutional Culture
January 2004 – Leading and Sustaining Change
August 2004 – Promoting a Positive Corrections Culture

Time series analysis

To test the whether the differences in the number of total incidents is significant over time (or more specifically between the pre-implementation phases and after implementation of the ICI), ARIMA was utilized to measure mean differences in incidents by month for the 23 full

months of data we possess for Site 1. The moving average (Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average) is calculated as a constant over the 23 iterations, in this case months. The t-ratio is the variance from the average at the beginning of the time series and the end. During the pre-test phase, the # of incidents is higher than at the end of the time series-- as visually demonstrated by Figure 1 above, but significance cannot be determined without additional regression analysis of the data over time. The results of the first ARIMA run are presented below:

Number of Residuals	23
Standard Error	33.75382
Log Likelihood	-112.08687
AIC	230.17373
SBC	233.58022

Analysis of Variance			
	DF Adj.	Sum of Squares	Residual Variance
Residuals	20	22814.045	1139.3201

Variables in the Model				
	B	SEB	T-Ratio	Approximate Probability
AR1	0.16583	0.233024	0.711643	0.4849045
TOTINCIDENT	-5.80469	1.239715	-4.682275	0.0001432
CONSTANT	361.02829	17.0672600	21.153266	0.0000000

The T-ratio indicates the difference in the average of the continuous variable (# total incidents) between time 1 (May 2003) and time 2 (March 2005). The analysis confirms the significant drop in total incidents from the pre-test phase through the latest month of post-test data. It is important to keep in mind that this significant result represents an *initial effect*, and that a *sustained effect* can only be confirmed with forthcoming data from this facility. As a check on the modeling used in this analysis, a similar time series was performed on the 17 months of post-test data only (not shown, but available from the authors) to test whether a significant difference in total incidents occurs *during* the implementation phase itself, thus possible confounding the results above. An analysis over the 17 post-test iterations (months) revealed no significant mean

differences in total incidents reported monthly during this time period, demonstrating that the significant difference is exclusive to the pre- and post-test phases of the ICI.

A similar analysis was conducted on the sub-category of violent incidents reported over the same time period at Site 1. As shown above in Figure 2, the trend analysis showed no change in effect between the pre- and post-test phases of the ICI. To confirm, another ARIMA analysis was performed using only reported incidents of violence. Results are presented below:

Number of Residuals	23
Standard Error	9.75417
Log Likelihood	-83.52276
AIC	173.04552
SBC	176.452

Analysis of Variance			
	DF Adj.	Sum of Squares	Residual Variance
Residuals	20	1902.9135	95.143737

Variables in the Model				
	B	SEB	T-Ratio	Approximate Probability
AR1	-0.021633	0.2302086	-0.093970	0.92606817
VAR00001	-0.155596	0.3009579	-0.517002	0.61082501
CONSTANT	46.785568	4.1247497	11.342644	0.00000000

The mean number of offenses decreased from time 1 to time 2, but not significantly so leading to the tentative conclusion that the ICI has not reduced institutional violence, at least in the initial stage of the evaluation. As mentioned above more data would have to be collected to conclusively determine impacts of the strategies in terms of both incident reduction and sustainability.

It is also important to point out what the preceding analyses cannot indicate. The data used in this evaluation has been collected using a quasi-experimental design method. Without a

control group for comparative purposes, it is impossible to determine if the significant effects demonstrated here, or those potentially revealed in future analyses, may be causally linked to the ICI alone. It is entirely possible that significant effects may be resultant from intervening variables such as a change in inmate or staff composition, changes in policy that affect incident reporting practices, or a change in data collecting for incident reports just to name a few. We must be extremely cautious also in basing conclusions on data from one institution. Time will allow for future waves of data from Site 1 as well as similar analyses of data from other institutions included in the NIC-ICI.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Our review of the design, implementations, and impact of NIC's institutional culture initiative identified several areas where the *design* of the initiative could be improved, including:

1. The development of specific, objective criteria for the initial selection of sites for participation in the project;

2. The development of a problem-driven "linkage" system that clearly describes the links between/among each of NIC's specific initiatives, as well as the criteria for determining the number and sequencing of various intervention combination;

3. The restructuring of both the "leading and sustaining change" and the "strategic management and planning" initiative into a single, much higher "dosage" culture change/organizational development initiative that is "problem-driven" with clearly defined roles for change "advisors" and much more time spent working on-site (at minimum 50 days per year) ; and

4. The implementation of new NIC-driven standards for subcontractors and NIC program staff that are designed to insure both the *integrity* of the initial site selection (and follow-up site selection) process, as well as the consistency of the intervention strategies being employed at each site.

While these recommendations certainly represent "new ways of doing business" for NIC, we strongly believe these changes are critical to the success of the initiative. Given the time, staff and resources invested to date on the initial development and implementation of this initiative, it seems clear that NIC is committed to developing effective evidence-based strategies for addressing long-standing problems related to prison conflict generally, and prison violence and disorder in particular.

Our review of the research on institutional culture generally – and culture change – in particular, has revealed that "culture change" initiatives, such as the one we describe here, do not have a strong empirical foundation (Bottoms, 1999). Moreover, there are a variety of innovative problem-solving strategies (e.g. the situational prison control strategies) described by Wortley (2002), and the conflict-centered strategy described by Edgar et at. (2003)) that do appear to be based on a much firmer empirical foundation. The challenge for NIC and other agencies interested in culture change (both staff and inmate-based) is to develop an array of *evidence-based* problem-solving strategies and then integrate these strategies into current staff-based culture change initiatives (e.g., strategic planning, leading and sustaining change). Ultimately, we suspect that specific problem-solving interventions designed to reduce the levels of violence and disorder in prison will need to address issues related to both staff and inmate cultures. Without close attention to institutional culture, the latest wave of prison reform initiatives (e.g.

situational prison control strategies, and conflict-centered strategies) will not be successful, in large part because they will not be implemented as designed.

The research literature on the link between various organizational change strategies and subsequent organizational performance emphasizes a simple truism: there is no "magic bullet" for organizational change; each organization is unique and different approaches work in different settings. Despite this caveat, it is possible to identify a few core principles of effective interventions at the organizational level.

1. The development of a problem solving approach that focuses on addressing the immediate problems that resulted in the initial requests for assistance (e.g. staff problems, management problems, and offender-related problems). The NIC-ICI does not necessarily take a problem solving approach. Instead the focus is more on a social network approach, particularly for the assessment phase.

2. Assessments that identify the risk factors that contribute to the environment that supports the unhealthy culture (e.g. overcrowding, riots, disturbances, high grievance levels, high inmate/staff ratios, lack of diversity, staff/mgt. turnover).

3. Interventions that are directly tied to the assessment. The assessment should drive the type of interventions used in the NIC-ICI including PPPC, Strategic Management and Planning, and Leading and Sustaining Change.

4. Interventions that are sufficient duration to create an environment for change, and that are reinforced over time. One-shot approaches tend to have a "short life"; organizations need a process for change that involves several steps building upon each other.

5. Interventions that use objective data to monitor the achievement of benchmarks. These benchmarks are then used to monitor progress, based on the notion that "what gets measured gets done".

Evaluation Lessons Learned

The evaluation team for this project has considerable experience working on programs and initiatives at varying stages of development. Essentially, this project has been evaluated during its formative stages of development, where the individual programmatic components are still undergoing many changes. Unfortunately NIC's approach has been to shift the format and

content of the initiative, periodically, under the guise of "fitting a situation", instead of

developing and implementing a model consistently for a period of time and then <u>revising</u> the

model based on the initial feedback from evaluators or both level/quality of implementation <u>and</u>

initial impact.   Evaluation, by its very nature, is a longer term process that requires considering a

range of issues regarding goals, program content, program delivery mechanisms, and processes,

in a "controlled" setting. A program that is constantly changing is, in effect, asking the evaluator

to "catch me if you can".

In consideration of the evaluation strategy used in this study (which is multidimensional,

including qualitative and quantitative approaches), the following are recommended for the study

of the implementation and impact of the next wave of the NIC-ICI :

1. Have the evaluation team review the initial design of the protocol to identify the
   theoretical foundation to support the change process. This process should occur
   before the protocol is implemented. This process will ensure that each protocol is
   designed to address culture issues in a manner that affects the operations of the
   prison.

2. Have the evaluation team collect baseline data at least three months before the NIC-
   ICI begin their work at selected sites.

3. Have a staff person on-site at each prison responsible for conducting the staff surveys
   and obtaining the objective data. The on-site person should be selected before any
   other work commences on site. Have the on-site person report monthly to the
   evaluation team.

4. Before any NIC-ICI work commences, have the prison team work with evaluator to
   establish change benchmarks. The evaluation team then should monitor these change
   benchmarks.

5. Collect data on offender's perception of the prison, including its culture. Use the
   offender data to understand the impact of the protocol and to learn more about the
   staff-offender dynamics in the prison.

6. Have the evaluation team report the findings directly to the prison to allow them to
   learn about their efforts.

7. Require more rigorous evaluation designs (quasi-experimental and/or experimental designs) and evidence-based intervention strategies in all subsequent culture change initiatives.

The underlying assumption of each of these recommendations is that external evaluators are critical to the success of the NIC initiative, because they offer an independent, objective, assessment of the design, implementation, and impact of the project. Based on the external review by the evaluation team, NIC can develop a new wave of initiatives that are evidence-based and represent "best practices" in this important policy area.

Appendix A: Leading and Sustaining Change; Summary of Interviews with Change Advisors working at each of the Four LSC Sites

(1) **Selection Process for Leading and Sustaining Change**: How did you get involved in the LSC initiative?
- Colleague referral
- CJI contact/Center for Organizational Change
- CJI contact/opportunity to work in a different, unique organizational setting
- CJI contact/new area for application of organizational development

(2) **Problem Definition**: How did you define and analyze the problem?
- Conducted a mini-reassessment of culture; the existing CJI assessment was too old to be useful. The person serving as the change advisor needs to conduct their own assessment.
- Attended close-out sessions by CJI assessment team; assisted in preparation of formal assessment report.
- On-site informal discussions with line staff, mgt. team, and warden; observations of offenders (approximately 30 interviews completed)
- Observer of on-site CJI Assessment process; interviews with lieutenants and captains.

(3) **Key Problems**: What were the Key Problems you identified at this prison?
- There were three related problems: staff turnover, retention, and recruitment. There was also the prevailing belief in this prison that the "worst" thing you could do – as an officer –is to get "too close" with inmates.
- There is a lack of trust (inmate-staff, staff-management; inmate-management) that pervades the institution; and it is a legitimate lack of trust, based on prior history of change at the facility. In addition, some line staff appear to be psychotically depressed, due to the resolution of prior grievances, promotional decisions, etc.
- There are divergent perspectives on the purpose of the facility by medical and custody staff. In addition, staff expressed a variety of procedural justice/fairness concerns, including fears that talking with the change advisors honestly about problems could lead to retaliation and/or physical safety threats (i.e. whistle blower fears).
- The underlying problems identified in this facility were no different than the problems typically identified in other

organizations, such as authority (versus responsibility), communication, and fairness.

(4) Dosage: On-site/off-site consulting activities?
- Contract is for 12 to 15 days per year, approximately one day per month. Lately, my work is conducted on the phone, due to the superintendent's schedule.
- Contract is for 15 days per year; approximately 7 days on-site and 8 days via phone (and for log/report preparation). Overall, about half my time is spent directly with warden and slightly less with the change team; a small percentage of time (2%) was also spent with central office.
- Approximately 2 days per month; 1/3 of time with warden and 2/3 of time with line staff; combination of on-site and telephone/e-mail contact.

(5) Progress to Date: What progress have you made in your work as a change advisor at this facility?
- Steering committee launched; alliances developed using a "triangulation strategy"; focus on improving working conditions for staff, as well as communication (between shifts) and staff recognition.
- Ad hoc advisory committee established; master plan developed to address on-going problems (e.g. pending lawsuits); "true recognition" program initiated.
- Average progress toward change goals, due to on-going communication issues.
- The development of the change team is my priority; focus on dialogue, relationship-building.

(6) Lessons Learned: Do you have suggestions for changes in the Leading and Sustaining Change (LSC) initiative?
- More time needs to be spent on-site at the beginning of the LSC initiative (approximately one week during the first month would be an optimal strategy).
- The role of the change advisor needs to be more clearly defined by NIC/CJI.
- The change advisor needs to conduct their own assessment of the culture problem, focus in on staff culture. There is no need to focus on the inmates; they are not the problem. It's a staff/mgt. culture problem.
- More time needs to be allocated by NIC/CJI at the outset in order for the "external" change advisor to better understand the unique cultural problems at the prison.

Appendix B: Applying "What Works" to the Problem of Prison Violence and Disorder

Much of the recent discussion of "what works" in corrections has been based on evidence-based reviews of the research on a particular topic of interest (e.g. prison-based treatment programs). The proliferation of "what works" reviews run the gamut from high quality, well-designed "scientific" reviews on the one hand to low quality, poorly designed unscientific reviews (otherwise known as nonsense)on the other. As we examine the conceptual framework, design, implementation, and initial impact of NIC's Institutional Culture Initiative, it is critical that we illustrate the need to distinguish the "science from nonsense" among the current wave of evidence-based reviews.

Defining What Works

Essentially, there are three basic types of evidence-based reviews: (1) the "gold standard" focuses only on randomized, controlled experiments; (2) the 'bronze standard" includes both experimental and (well-designed) quasi-experimental research (that includes comparison groups); and (3) the unscientific (or nonsense) approach of self-selecting a number of studies in an unsystematic manner, including experiments, quasi-experiments, and non-experimental research. The latter is often coupled by support from a particular program or strategy. In the most extreme form, the authors of the review simply allude to an evidence-based review or "best practices", with no supporting documentation. Unfortunately, much of what is available in the area of institutional falls into this last category.

From the outset, our evaluation of NIC's institutional culture initiative has been designed to address the long-standing criticisms of previous research conducted in prisons and jails across this country. For a variety of reasons, corrections managers have not supported the use of independent, external evaluations of corrections programs (and strategies) in their facilities. As a result, only a small number of external, independent evaluations have been conducted; and with only a few exceptions, these evaluations are often of such poor quality that they would n*ot* be included in the reviews of "evidence-based practice" that legislators and policymakers are now using as a blueprint for organizational change in a variety of police, court and corrections systems across the country. Because of this longstanding resistance to external, independent evaluation, today's corrections managers are at a distinct disadvantage, because they are unable to cite "best practices" (or evidence-based reviews) either to support their request for new resources, (and programs) or to bolster their claim of organizational effectiveness (and, of course, good management).

The "gold standard" for evidence-based research reviews mandates that at least two randomized field experiments must have been conducted on a particular program/strategy before we can offer an assessment of "what works" (see, e.g. the reviews conducted for the Cochrane Collaboration at www.campbellcollaboration.org). When applied to institutional corrections, the use of this gold standard results in a simple conclusion: we simply don't know what works (and what doesn't work) with offenders in correctional settings. Since 1980, only fourteen (14) randomized experiments have been conducted in corrections (Farrington and Welsh, 2005), including seven evaluations of *juvenile* corrections programs, [two evaluations of scared straight programs for male juveniles, four evaluations of boot camps for male juveniles, one evaluation

of a juvenile treatment facility (Paint Creek)] and seven evaluations of *adult* corrections programs [three evaluations of therapeutic communities for adult drug-involved inmates, and four evaluations targeting male prisoners placed in one of the following four treatment programs: reasoning and rehabilitation, social therapy, moral reconation therapy, and cognitive behavior treatment]. Obviously, much more rigorous evaluation research will have to be conducted before "evidence-based reviews" can be used to guide corrections practice in either adult or juvenile corrections facilities in the United States.

The lack of quality research in institutional settings on the impact of programs and strategies on offender change (upon release from prison or even within the prison setting) is not surprising, given the emphasis placed by prison administrators on controlling the level of violence and disorder *in* prison and jails. However, it is surprising that more quality research has not been conducted on the effectiveness of various institutional control strategies. Our review of the research on the effectiveness of various institutional control strategies highlights the paucity of research in this critical area. Regardless of whether your criterion of interest is short-term institutional control or long-term offender change, application of the "gold standard" to the existing body of evaluation research will lead to a simple conclusion: we don't know "what works' in prisons and jails, because the necessary evaluation research (independent, external, and using randomized designs) has yet to be completed.

One solution to the problems associated with applying the "gold standard" to the current body of corrections research is offered by the Campbell Collaborative--Lower your standards for including studies in your evidence-based reviews. Using what some have called a "bronze

standard", members of the Campbell Collaborative have conducted evidence-based reviews of a

wide range of criminal justice interventions. Based on this relaxed standard, both experimental

and well-designed quasi-experimental research studies (levels 3,4,5 on a quality scale ranging

from 1 (low) to 5 (high) would be examined. For a specific program or strategy to be deemed

effective, at least two level 3 (or higher) studies would be needed, with supporting research from

the majority of lower quality evaluations. We applied this bronze standard to the existing body

of research on prison violence and disorder (see Byrne,Taxman,and Hummer,2005 for a detailed

review) and as a result, a number of likely "causes" of prison violence and disorder can be

identified. For each of these causes, specific problem-solving strategies can be identified, based

on a "bronze standard" evidence-based review of the research:

(1) prison crowding

(2) staffing levels

(3) inadequate programming in prisons

(4) ineffective classification/placement practices

(5) poor management practices

(6) inadequate facility design

(7) situational context (e.g. daily routines, autonomy)

(8) offender profile (e.g. larger number/proportion of violent offenders in prison)

As we have emphasized from the initial stages of this evaluation, there is no body of

empirical research (level 3 or above) that can be identified linking "institutional culture"

(however defined and operationalized) to prison violence and disorder. Perhaps more

importantly, much of the research on the general subject of institutional culture conducted over

the past fifty years (from Sykes (60's) to Toch (70's) to Bottoms (90's) and Liebling (2005)) has

examined *inmate* culture; staff/management culture has been the subject of much speculation (see, e.g. Riveland, 1999) with almost no empirical research. When viewed in this context, the importance of the current external, independent (level 3) evaluation of the NIC institutional culture initiatives is certainly underscored.

Throughout the country, legislators and policymakers are incorporating evidence-based research reviews in new legislation and program initiatives for a broad range of criminal justice initiatives, including both institutional and community corrections. In at least five states, legislation has been passed that *prohibits* the development of new initiatives unless they are based on a detailed "evidence-based" review. Although there is currently a debate over the standards to the established for such a review (e.g. gold vs. bronze standards), there is an emerging consensus on the need for more – and better designed – evaluations of criminal justice interventions generally, and corrections strategies in particular.

The National Institute of Corrections has provided a broad range of technical assistance and program support for corrections administrators across the country, but it has not targeted funding for external, independent, rigorous evaluations of these initiatives. Because of this evaluation research "shortfall", it is almost impossible to determine the effectiveness of these initiatives, because outcome assessment is based largely on a combination of "self-evaluations" by subcontractors and/or client (i.e. prison administrators) satisfaction surveys. NIC's funding of this evaluation appears to represent a new perspective, not only on who is the "client" served by NIC (prison administrators or the public), but also on the need to develop an evidence-based approach to corrections, based on quality evaluation research.

While the research literature debates the internal vs. external researcher, the paucity of research on institutional corrections speaks to the need to ensure that good quality studies are conducted in this area to guide the growth and development of the field. The current plans to incorporate the evaluation component of the Institutional Culture Initiative into the service provision component would repeat history by not fostering the development of a quality research study into a critical area of policy study. Such practices of not funding external research represent a significant step *backward* for evidence-based corrections in the third year of the initiative. For this reason, we urge NIC to resist the urge to effectively transform the year 3 evaluation effort from an external, independent, (level 3) evaluation into the type of "self-evaluations" by service providers that have plagued the field of corrections for the past half-century.

Appendix C: Selected Tables and Figures

Total Incidents - Pre-Post Comparison*

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
Violent Incidents - Pre-Post Comparison

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An Overview of the Design, Development, and Implementation of the NIC Institutional Culture Initiative: 1999-2004

The NIC Institutional Culture Change Initiative: Project Timeline

| Design Phase ▶ | Development Phase ▶ | Implementation and Evaluation Phase ▶ |

1999 → **2000** → **2001** → **2002** → **2003** → **2004**

•Problem Analysis Resulting In Recommendations by NIC to Focus on Underlying Cause: Negative Culture
•Strategic Planning Project Design

•Ongoing Site Selection And Project Development
•Pre-Test of Cultural Assessment Protocol

•Evaluation Initiated -
•PPCC* Design and Pilot Testing
•Cultural Assessments Conducted
•Strategic Planning Initiative Pretested

•Cultural Assessment Protocol Developed

•Cultural Assessments Conducted

•Collection of Baseline Data For Ongoing Process & Impact Evaluation:
•PPCC Conducted
•Leading and Sustaining Change
•Cultural Assessment

* PPCC = Promoting Positive Corrections Culture